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Extensive games with possibly unaware players
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Source International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems table of contents
Hakodate, Japan
SESSION: Learning and evolution table of contents
Pages: 744 - 751  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-303-4
Authors
Joseph Y. Halpern  Cornell University
Leandro C. Rêgo  Cornell University
Sponsors
IFMAS : The International Foundation for Multiagent Systems
ATAL : The International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 5,   Downloads (12 Months): 43,   Citation Count: 10
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ABSTRACT

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they may not be aware of moves that they and other agents can make. We show how such games can be represented; the key idea is to describe the game from the point of view of every agent at every node of the game tree. We provide a generalization of Nash equilibrium and show that every game with awareness has a generalized Nash equilibrium. Finally, we extend these results to games with awareness of unawareness, where a player i may be aware that a player j can make moves that i is not aware of.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Y. Feinberg. Subjective reasoning---games with unawareness. Technical Report Resarch Paper Series #1875, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2004.
 
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Y. Feinberg. Games with incomplete awareness. Technical Report Research Paper Series #1894, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2005.
 
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Y. Gal and A. Pfeffer. Reasoning about agents' beliefs and decision-making processes in games. Unpublished manuscript, 2005.
 
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J. Y. Halpern. On ambiguities in the interpretation of game trees. Games and Economic Behavior, 20:66--96, 1997.
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J. Harsanyi. Games with incomplete information played by 'Bayesian' players, parts I--III. Management Science, 14:159--182, 320--334, 486--502, 1968.
 
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M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1994.
 
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J. Weinstein and M. Yildiz. Impact of higher-order uncertainty. Unpublished manuscript., 2003.

CITED BY  10

Collaborative Colleagues:
Joseph Y. Halpern: colleagues
Leandro C. Rêgo: colleagues