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DDoS defense by offense
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Source Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication archive
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications table of contents
Pisa, Italy
SESSION: Security table of contents
Pages: 303 - 314  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-308-5
Also published in ...
Authors
Michael Walfish  MIT
Mythili Vutukuru  MIT
Hari Balakrishnan  MIT
David Karger  MIT
Scott Shenker  UC Berkeley and ICSI
Sponsors
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

This paper presents the design, implementation, analysis, and experimental evaluation of speak-up, a defense against application-level distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), in which attackers cripple a server by sending legitimate-looking requests that consume computational resources (e.g., CPU cycles, disk). With speak-up, a victimized server encourages all clients, resources permitting, to automatically send higher volumes of traffic. We suppose that attackers are already using most of their upload bandwidth so cannot react to the encouragement. Good clients, however, have spare upload bandwidth and will react to the encouragement with drastically higher volumes of traffic. The intended outcome of this traffic inflation is that the good clients crowd out the bad ones, thereby capturing a much larger fraction of the server's resources than before. We experiment under various conditions and find that speak-up causes the server to spend resources on a group of clients in rough proportion to their aggregate upload bandwidth. This result makes the defense viable and effective for a class of real attacks.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  16

Collaborative Colleagues:
Michael Walfish: colleagues
Mythili Vutukuru: colleagues
Hari Balakrishnan: colleagues
David Karger: colleagues
Scott Shenker: colleagues