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SKMA: a key management architecture for SCADA systems
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Source ACM International Conference Proceeding Series; Vol. 167 archive
Proceedings of the 2006 Australasian workshops on Grid computing and e-research - Volume 54 table of contents
Hobart, Tasmania, Australia
Pages: 183 - 192  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN ~ ISSN:1445-1336 , 1-920-68236-8
Authors
Robert Dawson  Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
Colin Boyd  Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
Ed Dawson  Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
Juan Manuel González Nieto  Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
Publisher
Australian Computer Society, Inc.  Darlinghurst, Australia, Australia
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ABSTRACT

Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are widely used in the management of critical infrastructure such as electricity and water distribution systems. Currently there is little understanding of how to best protect SCADA systems from malicious attacks. We review the constraints and requirements for SCADA security and propose a suitable architecture (SKMA) for secure SCADA communications. The architecture includes a proposed key management protocol (SKMP). We compare the architecture with a previous proposal from Sandia Labs.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Robert Dawson: colleagues
Colin Boyd: colleagues
Ed Dawson: colleagues
Juan Manuel González Nieto: colleagues