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A framework for password-based authenticated key exchange1
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Volume 9 ,  Issue 2  (May 2006) table of contents
Pages: 181 - 234  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISSN:1094-9224
Authors
Rosario Gennaro  IBM, Hawthorne, NY
Yehuda Lindell  Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we present a general framework for password-based authenticated key exchange protocols, in the common reference string model. Our protocol is actually an abstraction of the key exchange protocol of Katz et al. and is based on the recently introduced notion of smooth projective hashing by Cramer and Shoup. We gain a number of benefits from this abstraction. First, we obtain a modular protocol that can be described using just three high-level cryptographic tools. This allows a simple and intuitive understanding of its security. Second, our proof of security is significantly simpler and more modular. Third, we are able to derive analogs to the Katz et al. protocol under additional cryptographic assumptions. Specifically, in addition to the DDH assumption used by Katz et al., we obtain protocols under both the quadratic and N-residuosity assumptions. In order to achieve this, we construct new smooth projective hash functions.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Rosario Gennaro: colleagues
Yehuda Lindell: colleagues