|
ABSTRACT
Current peer-to-peer systems rely on user intervention to install and update the software (protocols) that run on each node. We propose another direction where protocols are dynamically and automatically rolled-out over peers, with the peers themselves selecting those that are beneficial and rejecting those which are not. To achieve this, we argue that, new protocols should be "injected" live into a running P2P system, with peers themselves replicating them. This requires that peers select "socially beneficial" protocols even though they need to base this on their own individual performance evaluations. What we are proposing can be seen as a meta-protocol, which we call Automatic Social Bootstrapping, that intelligently selects and replicates those protocols that are for the social good --- that is, maximize the average utility of the entire population. We sketch an outline of the protocol and present some initial high-level simulation results. Finally we identify several open issues that need to be addressed in order to further develop the approach.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
| |
1
|
Arteconi, S. and Hales, D. Greedy Cheating Liars and the Fools Who Believe Them. University of Bologna, Dept. of Computer Science, Technical Report UBLCS-2005-21, (available at: http://www.cs.unibo.it/pub/TR/UBLCS/2005/). 2005.
|
| |
2
|
Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York. 1984.
|
| |
3
|
Cohen, B. Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent. Presented at the 1st Workshop on the Economics of Peer-2-Peer Systems, June 5--6, Berkley, CA, (available at: http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/conferences/p2pecon/) 2003.
|
| |
4
|
|
 |
5
|
Michal Feldman , Kevin Lai , Ion Stoica , John Chuang, Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks, Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, May 17-20, 2004, New York, NY, USA
[doi> 10.1145/988772.988788]
|
| |
6
|
Hales, D. and Edmonds, B. Applying a socially-inspired technique (tags) to improve cooperation in P2P Networks. IEEE Transactions in Systems, Man and Cybernetics - Part A: Systems and Humans, 35(3):385--395, 2005.
|
| |
7
|
|
| |
8
|
Hales, D. Choose Your Tribe! - Evolution at the Next Level in a Peer-to-Peer Network. In Engineering Self-Organising Systems. Proc. of the 3rd Workshop on Engineering Self-Organising Applications, LNCS 3910, Springer. 2006.
|
 |
9
|
|
| |
10
|
Patarin, S. and Makpangou, M. Pandora: an efficient platform for the construction of autonomic applications. In Self-Star Properties in Complex Information Systems, LNCS 3460, Springer.
|
| |
11
|
Riolo, R. L., Cohen, M. D. and Axelrod, R. Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity. Nature 414, 441-443 2001.
|
| |
12
|
Strahilevitz, L. Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, (available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=329700), 2003.
|
| |
13
|
BitTorrent Webpage: http://www.bittorrent.com
|
| |
14
|
Skype Webpage: http://www.skype.com
|
| |
15
|
Edonkey Webpage: http://www.edonkey.com
|
CITED BY
|
|
Gareth Tyson , Paul Grace , Andreas Mauthe , Sebastian Kaune, The survival of the fittest: an evolutionary approach to deploying adaptive functionality in peer-to-peer systems, Proceedings of the 7th workshop on Reflective and adaptive middleware, p.23-28, December 01-05, 2008, Leuven, Belgium
|
|