A reputation mechanism for layered communities

ABSTRACT

The exchange of digital goods via peer-to-peer (P2P) systems is a challenging problem for e-commerce. Participants rarely know each other, and may be completely anonymous, so the self-interest of the participants works against trust and they miss out on the benefits of cooperation. Reputation mechanisms help to remedy selfish misbehaviour. In this paper a new layered reputation mechanism establishes a trusted P2P environment, with bad content filtered out and novel content continuously introduced, by giving appropriate incentives to participants. A simulation was created and experiments run to validate the design.

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  I. Computing Methodologies
  I.2 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
        I.2.11 Distributed Artificial Intelligence
            Subjects: Coherence and coordination

Additional Classification:
  H. Information Systems
  H.4 INFORMATION SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS
      H.4.2 Types of Systems
          Subjects: Decision support (e.g., MIS)
  H.5 INFORMATION INTERFACES AND PRESENTATION (I.7)
      H.5.3 Group and Organization Interfaces

General Terms:
Design, Theory

Keywords:
collaboration, incentives, peer-to-peer, reputation mechanism