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IMPRES: integrated monitoring for processor reliability and security
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Source Annual ACM IEEE Design Automation Conference archive
Proceedings of the 43rd annual Design Automation Conference table of contents
San Francisco, CA, USA
SESSION: Session 31: secure systems table of contents
Pages: 502 - 505  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-381-6
Authors
Roshan G. Ragel  The University of New South Wales and National Information and Communications Technology Australia, Sydney NSW Australia
Sri Parameswaran  The University of New South Wales and National Information and Communications Technology Australia, Sydney NSW Australia
Sponsors
SIGDA: ACM Special Interest Group on Design Automation
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 17,   Downloads (12 Months): 49,   Citation Count: 4
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ABSTRACT

Security and reliability in processor based systems are concernsrequiring adroit solutions.Securityis often compromised by code injection attacks, jeopardizing even `trusted software'.Reliabilityis of concern where unintended code is executed in modern processors with ever smaller feature sizes and low voltage swings causing bit flips. Countermeasures by software-only approaches increasecodesize by large amounts and therefore significantly reduce performance. Hardware assisted approaches add extensive amountsofhardware monitors and thus incur unacceptably highhardware cost. This paper presents a novel hardware/softwaretechniqueat the granularity of micro-instructions to reduce overheads considerably. Experiments show thatour technique incurs an additional hardware overhead of 0.91% and clock period increase of 0.06%. Average clock cycle and code size overheads are just 11.9% and 10.6% forfive industrystandard application benchmarks. These overheads are far smaller than have been previously encountered.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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C. Cowan et al. StackGuard: Automatic Adaptive Detection and Prevention of Buffer-Overflow Attacks. In Proc. 7th USENIX Security Conference, pages 63--78, San Antonio, Texas, 1998.
 
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Gunter Ollmann. Second-order Code Injection Attacks: Advanced Code Injection Techniques and Testing Procedures, 2003.
 
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R. Lee et al. Enlisting hardware architecture to thwart malicious code injection. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Security in Pervasive Computing. Springer Verlag LNCS, March 2003.
 
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J. McGregor et al. A processor architecture defense against buffer overflow attacks. In Proceedings of the SPC'03, pages 237--252. Springer Verlag, March 2003.
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R. G. Ragel and S. Parameswaran. Soft error detection and recovery in application specific instruction-set processors. In Proceedings of the SELSE-1, April 2005.
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The PEAS Team. ASIP Meister, http://www.eda-meister.org/asip-meister/, 2002.
 
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The Synopsys Team. Synopsys Design Compiler, The industry standard for logic synthesis. http://www.synopsys.com/.
 
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D. Wagner et al. A first step towards automated detection of buffer overrun vulnerabilities. In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, pages 3--17, San Diego, CA, February 2000.
 
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J. Xu et al. Architecture support for defending against buffer overflow attacks. In EASY-2 Workshop, October 2002.
 
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Y. Younan, W. Joosen, and F. Piessens. Code injection in C and CPP: A Survey of Vulnerabilities and Countermeasure, July 2004.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Roshan G. Ragel: colleagues
Sri Parameswaran: colleagues