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Average case vs. worst case: margins of safety in system design
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Source New Security Paradigms Workshop archive
Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on New security paradigms table of contents
Lake Arrowhead, California
SESSION: Design considerations table of contents
Pages: 25 - 32  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-317-4
Authors
Christian W. Probst  Technical University of Denmark, Kongens Lyngby, Denmark
Andreas Gal  University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA
Michael Franz  University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA
Sponsor
ACSA : Applied Computer Security Associates
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We predict that we will soon witness attacks on all kinds of systems that will be based on the attacked systems' worst-case behavior. For example, the worst-case performance of Java Bytecode Verification rises quadratically with program length. By sending a legal, but difficult-to-verify program to a server virtual machine, we can keep that server occupied for an inordinate amount of time, effectively making it unavailable for useful work. The problem, however, is not restricted to mobile-code verification: for example, an attacker could exploit knowledge about a just-in-time compiler's register allocator by sending it a particularly difficult to solve graph-coloring puzzle. The same vulnerability can be exploited if the attacker has intimate knowledge of the data structures used in the attacked system. Similar problems occur in hardware, e.g. with respect to power variability or the heat dissipation of processors. Malicious programs can exploit which parts of computer chips dissipate power, thereby overheating regions of the chip that are known to contain no temperature sensors. This attack could be used to affect battery life or cause early chip aging. Unfortunately, worst case-based attacks are hard to counter without also limiting the system's behavior in the average case.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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CERT Coordination Center, Carnegie Mellon University, http://www.cert.org.
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A. Gal, C. W. Probst, and M. Franz. An Applet performing a complexty-based Denial-of-Service attack on the verifier. Available at http://nil.ics.uci.edu/exploit.
 
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A. Gal, C. W. Probst, and M. Franz. A Denial of Service Attack on the Java Bytecode Verifier. Technical Report 03--23, University of California, Irvine, School of Information and Computer Science, 2003.
 
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A. Gal, C. W. Probst, and M. Franz. Proofing: An Efficient and Safe Alternative to Mobile-Code Verification. Technical Report 03--24, University of California, Irvine, School of Information and Computer Science, November 2003.
 
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A. Gal, C. W. Probst, and M. Franz. Integrated Java Bytecode Verification. In Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Abstract Interpretation of Object Oriented Languages, January 2005.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Christian W. Probst: colleagues
Andreas Gal: colleagues
Michael Franz: colleagues