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Resolving islands of security problem for DNSSEC
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Source International Conference On Communications And Mobile Computing archive
Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Wireless communications and mobile computing table of contents
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
SESSION: R1-D: general symposium table of contents
Pages: 1271 - 1276  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-306-9
Authors
Eunjong Kim  Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO
Ashish Gupta  Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO
Batsukh Tsendjav  Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO
Dan Massey  Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO
Sponsor
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to add origin authentication and integrity. DNSSEC defined a public key infrastructure over DNS tree hierarchy for the public key validation. In DNSSEC, a parent zone authenticates public keys of its child zones. The authentication hierarchy is broken when a parent does not support DNSSEC. This paper proposes an effective mechanism to overcome this partial deployment problem. Our solution uses a public bulletin board for zones to post their DNSKEY information. Resolvers use posted key information to find key authentication chains that can be used to validate the DNSKEY. Bulletin Board(BB) provides complete trust relationship information when the key authentication hierarchy is broken, and distributes the complete key information even when false zones provide the invalid keys. The bulletin board does not guarantee the correctness of DNSKEY information, but it does guarantee the completeness of the key information. Our approach helps DNS zones to deploy DNSSEC even when their parent zones do not deploy DNSSEC, and it does not require any changes to the current DNSSEC protocol and the existing software.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
DNSSEC in .NL. http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/dnssec.
 
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DNSSEC in .SE. http://dnssec.nic-se.se.
 
3
Marc Horowitz, PGP public key serve. http://www.mit.edu/people/marc/pks, 1997.
 
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Patrick McDaniel and Sugih Jamin. A Scalable Key Distribution Hierarchy. In Technical Report, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Michigan, pages CSE-TR-366--98, 1998.
 
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R. Arends, R. Austein, M. Larson, D. Massey, and S. Rose. DNS Security Introduction and Requirements, March 2005.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Eunjong Kim: colleagues
Ashish Gupta: colleagues
Batsukh Tsendjav: colleagues
Dan Massey: colleagues