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Forensic analysis of database tampering
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Source International Conference on Management of Data archive
Proceedings of the 2006 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data table of contents
Chicago, IL, USA
SESSION: Authentication table of contents
Pages: 109 - 120  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-434-0
Authors
Kyriacos Pavlou  University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ
Richard T. Snodgrass  University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGMOD: ACM Special Interest Group on Management of Data
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Mechanisms now exist that detect tampering of a database, through the use of cryptographically-strong hash functions. This paper addresses the next problem, that of determining who, when, and what, by providing a systematic means of performing forensic analysis after such tampering has been uncovered. We introduce a schematic representation termed a "corruption diagram" that aids in intrusion investigation. We use these diagrams to fully analyze the original proposal, that of a linked sequence of hash values. We examine the various kinds of intrusions that are possible, including retroactive, introactive, backdating, and postdating intrusions. We then introduce successively more sophisticated forensic analysis algorithms: the monochromatic, RGB, and polychromatic algorithms, and characterize the "forensic strength" of these algorithms. We show how forensic analysis can efficiently extract a good deal of information concerning a corruption event.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Kyriacos Pavlou: colleagues
Richard T. Snodgrass: colleagues