| Applying flow-sensitive CQUAL to verify MINIX authorization check placement |
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Programming languages and analysis for security
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Proceedings of the 2006 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
table of contents
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
SESSION: Authorization and monitoring
table of contents
Pages: 3 - 6
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-374-3
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 11, Downloads (12 Months): 51, Citation Count: 3
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ABSTRACT
We present the first use of flow-sensitive CQUAL to verify the placement of operating system authorization checks. Our analysis of MINIX 3 system servers and discovery of a non-exploitable Time-Of-Check/Time-Of-Use bug demonstrate the effectiveness of flow sensitive CQUAL and its advantage over earlier flow-insensitive versions. We also identify and suggest alternatives to current CQUAL usability features that encourage analysts to make omissions that cause the otherwise sound tool to produce false-negative results.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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CITED BY 3
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A. Prasad Sistla , V. N. Venkatakrishnan , Michelle Zhou , Hilary Branske, CMV: automatic verification of complete mediation for java virtual machines, Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security, March 18-20, 2008, Tokyo, Japan
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