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Approximation algorithms and online mechanisms for item pricing
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Source Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents
Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
Pages: 29 - 35  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-236-4
Authors
Maria-Florina Balcan  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Avrim Blum  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 7,   Downloads (12 Months): 43,   Citation Count: 9
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ABSTRACT

We present approximation and online algorithms for a number of problems of pricing items for sale so as to maximize seller's revenue in an unlimited supply setting. Our first result is an O(k)-approximation algorithm for pricing items to single-minded bidders who each want at most k items. This improves over recent independent work of Briest and Krysta [5] who achieve an O(k2) bound. For the case k = 2, where we obtain a 4-approximation, this can be viewed as the following graph vertex pricing problem: given a (multi) graph G with valuations we on the edges, find prices pi ≥ 0 for the vertices to maximize Σ (pi + pj). {e=(i,j):wepi + pj.We also improve the approximation of Guruswami et al. [11] from O(log m + log n) to O(log n), where m is the number of bidders and n is the number of items, for the "highway problem" in which all desired subsets are intervals on a line.Our approximation algorithms can be fed into the generic reduction of Balcan et al. [2] to yield an incentive-compatible auction with nearly the same performance guarantees so long as the number of bidders is sufficiently large. In addition, we show how our algorithms can be combined with results of Blum and Hartline [3], Blum et al. [4], and Kalai and Vempala [13] to achieve good performance in the online setting, where customers arrive one at a time and each must be presented a set of item prices based only on knowledge of the customers seen so far.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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A. Goldberg, J. Hartline, A. Karlin, M. Saks, and A. Wright. Competitive auctions. Games and Economic Behavior. (To appear). An earlier version available as InterTrust Technical Report STAR-TR-99.09.01.
 
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J. Hartline and V. Koltun. Near-Optimal Pricing in Near-Linear Time . In 9th Workshop on Algorithms and Data Structures, pages 422--431, 2005.
 
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H. B. McMahan and A. Blum. Online Geometric Optimization in the Bandit Setting Against an Adaptive Adversary. In Proceedings of 17th Conference on Computational Learning Theory, pages 109--123, 2004.
 
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CITED BY  9

Collaborative Colleagues:
Maria-Florina Balcan: colleagues
Avrim Blum: colleagues