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ABSTRACT
We present a truthful auction for pricing advertising slots on a web-page assuming that advertisements for different merchants must be ranked in decreasing order of their (weighted) bids. This captures both the Overture model where bidders are ranked in order of the submitted bids, and the Google model where bidders are ranked in order of the expected revenue (or utility) that their advertisement generates. Assuming separable click-through rates, we prove revenue-equivalence between our auction and the non-truthful next-price auctions currently in use.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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[doi> 10.1145/1064009.1064014]
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CITED BY 31
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Jon Feldman , S Muthukrishnan , Martin Pal , Cliff Stein, Budget optimization in search-based advertising auctions, Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 11-15, 2007, San Diego, California, USA
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Christian Borgs , Jennifer Chayes , Nicole Immorlica , Kamal Jain , Omid Etesami , Mohammad Mahdian, Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions, Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web, May 08-12, 2007, Banff, Alberta, Canada
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Gagan Aggarwal , Nir Ailon , Florin Constantin , Eyal Even-Dar , Jon Feldman , Gereon Frahling , Monika R. Henzinger , S. Muthukrishnan , Noam Nisan , Martin Pál , Mark Sandler , Anastasios Sidiropoulos, Theory research at Google, ACM SIGACT News, v.39 n.2, June 2008
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Eyal Even Dar , Vahab S. Mirrokni , S. Muthukrishnan , Yishay Mansour , Uri Nadav, Bid optimization for broad match ad auctions, Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web, April 20-24, 2009, Madrid, Spain
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