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Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
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Source Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents
Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
Pages: 1 - 7  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-236-4
Authors
Gagan Aggarwal  Google Inc.
Ashish Goel  Stanford University
Rajeev Motwani  Stanford University
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 9,   Downloads (12 Months): 142,   Citation Count: 31
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ABSTRACT

We present a truthful auction for pricing advertising slots on a web-page assuming that advertisements for different merchants must be ranked in decreasing order of their (weighted) bids. This captures both the Overture model where bidders are ranked in order of the submitted bids, and the Google model where bidders are ranked in order of the expected revenue (or utility) that their advertisement generates. Assuming separable click-through rates, we prove revenue-equivalence between our auction and the non-truthful next-price auctions currently in use.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

1
 
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E. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11:17--33, 1971.
 
3
B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwarz. Internet advertising and the generalized second price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. Working paper, http://rwj.berkeley.edu/schwarz/, 2005.
 
4
J. Feng, H. Bhargava, , and D. Pennock. Implementing sponsored search in web search engines: computational evaluation of alternative mechanisms. To appear in the Informs Journal on Computing, 2006.
 
5
T. Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617--631, 1973.
 
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C. Simon and L. Blume. Mathematics for Economics. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 1994.
 
8
W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16:8--37, 1961.

CITED BY  31

Collaborative Colleagues:
Gagan Aggarwal: colleagues
Ashish Goel: colleagues
Rajeev Motwani: colleagues