ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Information-theoretically secure protocols and security under composition
Full text PdfPdf (258 KB)
Source Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Seattle, WA, USA
SESSION: Session 2B table of contents
Pages: 109 - 118  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-134-1
Authors
Eyal Kushilevitz  Computer Science Dept., Technion, Israel
Yehuda Lindell  Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Tal Rabin  IBM T.J. Watson, New York
Sponsors
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 9,   Downloads (12 Months): 65,   Citation Count: 3
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1132516.1132532
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

We investigate the question of whether security of protocols in the information-theoretic setting (where the adversary is computationally unbounded) implies security under concurrent composition. This question is motivated by the folklore that all known protocols that are secure in the information-theoretic setting are indeed secure under concurrent composition. We provide answers to this question for a number of different settings (i.e., considering perfect versus statistical security, and concurrent composition with adaptive versus fixed inputs). Our results enhance the understanding of what is necessary for obtaining security under composition, as well as providing tools (i.e., composition theorems) that can be used for proving the security of protocols under composition while considering only the standard stand-alone definitions of security.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
 
2
3
 
4
R. Canetti. Security and Composition of Multiparty Cryptographic Protocols. Journal of Cryptology, 13(1):143--202, 2000.
 
5
6
 
7
R. Cramer, I. Damgård, S. Dziembowski, M. Hirt, and T. Rabin. Efficient Multiparty Computations with Dishonest Minority. In EUROCRYPT'99, Springer-Verlag (LNCS 1592), pages 311--326, 1999.
 
8
 
9
 
10
11
 
12
Uri Feige. Alternative Models for Zero Knowledge Interactive Proofs. PhD thesis, 1990.
 
13
14
 
15
16
 
17
 
18
Y. Lindell. Lower Bounds for Concurrent Self Composition. In 1st TCC, Springer-Verlag (LNCS 2951), pages 203--222, 2004.
 
19
20
21
 
22
A. C-C. Yao. How to Generate and Exchange Secrets. In 27th FOCS, pages 162--167, 1986.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Eyal Kushilevitz: colleagues
Yehuda Lindell: colleagues
Tal Rabin: colleagues