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Black-box constructions for secure computation
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Source Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Seattle, WA, USA
SESSION: Session 2B table of contents
Pages: 99 - 108  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-134-1
Authors
Yuval Ishai  Department of Computer Science, Technion, Israel
Eyal Kushilevitz  Department of Computer Science, Technion, Israel
Yehuda Lindell  Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Erez Petrank  Department of Computer Science, Technion, Israel
Sponsors
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

It is well known that the secure computation of non-trivial functionalities in the setting of no honest majority requires computational assumptions. We study the way such computational assumptions are used. Specifically, we ask whether the secure protocol can use the underlying primitive (e.g., one-way trapdoor permutation) in a black-box way, or must it be nonblack-box (by referring to the code that computes this primitive)? Despite the fact that many general constructions of cryptographic schemes (e.g., CPA-secure encryption) refer to the underlying primitive in a black-box way only, there are some constructions that are inherently nonblack-box. Indeed, all known constructions of protocols for general secure computation that are secure in the presence of a malicious adversary and without an honest majority use the underlying primitive in a nonblack-box way (requiring to prove in zero-knowledge statements that relate to the primitive).In this paper, we study whether such nonblack-box use is essential. We present protocols that use only black-box access to a family of (enhanced) trapdoor permutations or to a homomorphic public-key encryption scheme. The result is a protocol whose communication complexity is independent of the computational complexity of the underlying primitive (e.g., a trapdoor permutation) and whose computational complexity grows only linearly with that of the underlying primitive. This is the first protocol to exhibit these properties.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Yuval Ishai: colleagues
Eyal Kushilevitz: colleagues
Yehuda Lindell: colleagues
Erez Petrank: colleagues