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A refined look at Bernstein's AES side-channel analysis
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Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Taipei, Taiwan
SESSION: Fast abstract session: cryptosystem table of contents
Pages: 369 - 369  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-272-0
Authors
Michael Neve  UCL Crypto Group, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
Jean-Pierre Seifert  Intel Corporation, Hillsboro, Oregon
Zhenghong Wang  Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In a recent manuscript Dan Bernstein claims the successful extraction of an AES key from a network server through another client computer. His side-channel attack was actually the simplest conceivable timing analysis of AES. Although Bernstein gave no thorough analysis of his methodology or the underlying technique the paper contained the full C-source code. This was actually very useful to repeat, analyze and extend his experiments and technique. Our paper improves upon the work done by Bernstein in the following ways:



Collaborative Colleagues:
Michael Neve: colleagues
Jean-Pierre Seifert: colleagues
Zhenghong Wang: colleagues