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Improved proxy re-encryption schemes with applications to secure distributed storage
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Source ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) archive
Volume 9 ,  Issue 1  (February 2006) table of contents
Pages: 1 - 30  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISSN:1094-9224
Authors
Giuseppe Ateniese  The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
Kevin Fu  University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA
Matthew Green  The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
Susan Hohenberger  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss (BBS) proposed an application called atomic proxy re-encryption, in which a semitrusted proxy converts a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext for Bob without seeing the underlying plaintext. We predict that fast and secure re-encryption will become increasingly popular as a method for managing encrypted file systems. Although efficiently computable, the wide-spread adoption of BBS re-encryption has been hindered by considerable security risks. Following recent work of Dodis and Ivan, we present new re-encryption schemes that realize a stronger notion of security and demonstrate the usefulness of proxy re-encryption as a method of adding access control to a secure file system. Performance measurements of our experimental file system demonstrate that proxy re-encryption can work effectively in practice.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  9


REVIEW

"Stefano Zanero : Reviewer"

Handling the delegation of materials encrypted with a public key without handing over the private key, and instead allowing a proxy to transparently modify the ciphertext in such a way as to allow a designated third party access to it is a well-kn  more...

Collaborative Colleagues:
Giuseppe Ateniese: colleagues
Kevin Fu: colleagues
Matthew Green: colleagues
Susan Hohenberger: colleagues