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An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
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Source Symposium on Discrete Algorithms archive
Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm table of contents
Miami, Florida
Pages: 1064 - 1073  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:0-89871-605-5
Authors
Shahar Dobzinski  The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Michael Schapira  The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Sponsors
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
: SIAM Activity Group on Discrete Mathematics
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 9,   Downloads (12 Months): 68,   Citation Count: 13
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ABSTRACT

We explore the allocation problem in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. We provide an e/e-1 approximation algorithm for this problem. Moreover, our algorithm applies to the more general class of XOS bidders. By presenting a matching unconditional lower bound in the communication model, we prove that the upper bound is tight for the XOS class.Our algorithm improves upon the previously known 2-approximation algorithm. In fact, we also exhibit another algorithm which obtains an approximation ratio better than 2 for submodular bidders, even in the value queries model.Throughout the paper we highlight interesting connections between combinatorial auctions with XOS and submodular bidders and various other combinatorial optimization problems. In particular, we discuss coverage problems and online problems.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Shahar Dobzinski and Michael Schapira. Optimal upper and lower approximation bounds for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions, 2005. Working paper.
 
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CITED BY  13

Collaborative Colleagues:
Shahar Dobzinski: colleagues
Michael Schapira: colleagues