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Towards computationally sound symbolic analysis of key exchange protocols
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Source Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering archive
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering table of contents
Fairfax, VA, USA
SESSION: Session 1 table of contents
Pages: 23 - 32  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-231-3
Authors
Prateek Gupta  University of Texas at Austin
Vitaly Shmatikov  University of Texas at Austin
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 1,   Downloads (12 Months): 26,   Citation Count: 1
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ABSTRACT

We present a cryptographically sound formal method for proving correctness of key exchange protocols. Our main tool is a fragment of a symbolic protocol logic. We demonstrate that proofs of key agreement and key secrecy in this logic imply simulatability in Shoup's secure multi-party framework for key exchange. As part of the logic, we present cryptographically sound abstractions of CMA-secure digital signatures and a restricted form of Diffie-Hellman exponentiation, which is a technical result of independent interest. We illustrate our method by constructing a proof of security for a simple authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Prateek Gupta: colleagues
Vitaly Shmatikov: colleagues