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Control-flow integrity
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, VA, USA
SESSION: Automated analysis table of contents
Pages: 340 - 353  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-226-7
Authors
Martín Abadi  University of California, Santa Cruz
Mihai Budiu  Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley
Úlfar Erlingsson  Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley
Jay Ligatti  Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 17,   Downloads (12 Months): 183,   Citation Count: 29
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ABSTRACT

Current software attacks often build on exploits that subvert machine-code execution. The enforcement of a basic safety property, Control-Flow Integrity (CFI), can prevent such attacks from arbitrarily controlling program behavior. CFI enforcement is simple, and its guarantees can be established formally even with respect to powerful adversaries. Moreover, CFI enforcement is practical: it is compatible with existing software and can be done efficiently using software rewriting in commodity systems. Finally, CFI provides a useful foundation for enforcing further security policies, as we demonstrate with efficient software implementations of a protected shadow call stack and of access control for memory regions.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  29

Collaborative Colleagues:
Martín Abadi: colleagues
Mihai Budiu: colleagues
Úlfar Erlingsson: colleagues
Jay Ligatti: colleagues