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Improving Brumley and Boneh timing attack on unprotected SSL implementations
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, VA, USA
SESSION: Authentication table of contents
Pages: 139 - 146  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-226-7
Authors
Onur Aciiçmez  Oregon State University, Corvallis
Werner Schindler  Bundesamt für Sicherheit, Bonn, Germany
Çetin K. Koç  Oregon State University, Corvallis
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
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ABSTRACT

Since the remarkable work of Kocher [7], several papers considering different types of timing attacks have been published. In 2003, Brumley and Boneh presented a timing attack on unprotected OpenSSL implementations [2]. In this paper, we improve the efficiency of their attack by a factor of more than 10. We exploit the timing behavior of Montgomery multiplications in the table initialization phase, which allows us to increase the number of multiplications that provide useful information to reveal one of the prime factors of RSA moduli. We also present other improvements, which can be applied to the attack in [2].


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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D. Brumley, D. Boneh: Remote Timing Attacks are Practical. In: Proceedings of the 12th Usenix Security Symposium, 2003.
 
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B. Canvel, A. Hiltgen, S. Vaudenay, M. Vuagnoux: Password Interception in a SSL/TSL Channel. In: D. Boneh (ed.): Crypto 2003, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2729, Springer, Heidelberg (2003), 583--599.
 
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D. Coppersmith: Small Solutions to Polynomial Equations, and Low Exponent RSA Vulnerabilities. J. Cryptology 10 (no. 4) (1997) 233--260.
 
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W. Feller: Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications (Vol. 1). 3rd edition, revised printing, New York, Wiley (1970).
 
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W. Schindler: Optimized Timing Attacks against Public Key Cryptosystems. Statist. Decisions 20 (2002), 191--210.
 
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W. Schindler: On the Optimization of Side-Channel Attacks by Advanced Stochastic Methods. In: S. Vaudenay (ed.): Public Key Cryptography --- PKC 2005, Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3386, Berlin 2005, 85--103.
 
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GNU Project: GMP: http://www.swox.com/gmp/.
 
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OpenSSL Project: OpenSSL: http://www.openssl.org.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Onur Aciiçmez: colleagues
Werner Schindler: colleagues
Çetin K. Koç: colleagues