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Controlling the effects of anomalous ARP behaviour on ethernet networks
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Source International Conference On Emerging Networking Experiments And Technologies archive
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM conference on Emerging network experiment and technology table of contents
Toulouse, France
SESSION: Dependable and secure networks table of contents
Pages: 50 - 60  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-197-X
Authors
D. Ármannsson  Reykjavík University
G. Hjálmtýsson  Reykjavík University
P. D. Smith  Lancaster University
L. Mathy  Lancaster University
Sponsor
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

There are a large number of large-scale Ethernet-based local and metropolitan area networks in use. A significant reason for this prolific deployment is the relatively simple manner in which they can be configured and deployed. A critical service on these networks, that epitomises the simple nature of Ethernet, is the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP). This protocol is used to determine the link-layer address of a host given its network-layer identifier, and uses the intrinsic broadcast capability of Ethernet to determine these mappings. In this paper, we present an analysis of ARP behaviour on three sizable local area networks and show that due to poorly configured or malicious software (e.g. viruses) on hosts, performance issues could arise because of ARP. We also propose a scheme that can be used to manage the effect of the problems identified in our analysis.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
D. Ármannsson: colleagues
G. Hjálmtýsson: colleagues
P. D. Smith: colleagues
L. Mathy: colleagues