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The taser intrusion recovery system
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Source ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles archive
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles table of contents
Brighton, United Kingdom
SESSION: Containment table of contents
Pages: 163 - 176  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-079-5
Also published in ...
Authors
Ashvin Goel  University of Toronto
Kenneth Po  University of Toronto
Kamran Farhadi  University of Toronto
Zheng Li  University of Toronto
Eyal de Lara  University of Toronto
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Recovery from intrusions is typically a very time-consuming operation in current systems. At a time when the cost of human resources dominates the cost of computing resources, we argue that next generation systems should be built with automated intrusion recovery as a primary goal. In this paper, we describe the design of Taser, a system that helps in selectively recovering legitimate file-system data after an attack or local damage occurs. Taser reverts tainted, i.e. attack-dependent, file-system operations but preserves legitimate operations. This process is difficult for two reasons. First, the set of tainted operations is not known precisely. Second, the recovery process can cause conflicts when legitimate operations depend on tainted operations. Taser provides several analysis policies that aid in determining the set of tainted operations. To handle conflicts, Taser uses automated resolution policies that isolate the tainted operations. Our evaluation shows that Taser is effective in recovering from a wide range of intrusions as well as damage caused by system management errors.


REFERENCES

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CITED BY  7

Collaborative Colleagues:
Ashvin Goel: colleagues
Kenneth Po: colleagues
Kamran Farhadi: colleagues
Zheng Li: colleagues
Eyal de Lara: colleagues