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Vigilante: end-to-end containment of internet worms
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Source ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles archive
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles table of contents
Brighton, United Kingdom
SESSION: Containment table of contents
Pages: 133 - 147  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-079-5
Also published in ...
Authors
Manuel Costa  University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK and Microsoft Research Ltd., Cambridge, UK
Jon Crowcroft  University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
Miguel Castro  Microsoft Research Ltd., Cambridge, UK
Antony Rowstron  Microsoft Research Ltd., Cambridge, UK
Lidong Zhou  Microsoft Research Silicon Valley, CA
Lintao Zhang  Microsoft Research Silicon Valley, CA
Paul Barham  Microsoft Research Ltd., Cambridge, UK
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Worm containment must be automatic because worms can spread too fast for humans to respond. Recent work has proposed network-level techniques to automate worm containment; these techniques have limitations because there is no information about the vulnerabilities exploited by worms at the network level. We propose Vigilante, a new end-to-end approach to contain worms automatically that addresses these limitations. Vigilante relies on collaborative worm detection at end hosts, but does not require hosts to trust each other. Hosts run instrumented software to detect worms and broadcast self-certifying alerts (SCAs) upon worm detection. SCAs are proofs of vulnerability that can be inexpensively verified by any vulnerable host. When hosts receive an SCA, they generate filters that block infection by analysing the SCA-guided execution of the vulnerable software. We show that Vigilante can automatically contain fast-spreading worms that exploit unknown vulnerabilities without blocking innocuous traffic.


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CITED BY  66

Collaborative Colleagues:
Manuel Costa: colleagues
Jon Crowcroft: colleagues
Miguel Castro: colleagues
Antony Rowstron: colleagues
Lidong Zhou: colleagues
Lintao Zhang: colleagues
Paul Barham: colleagues