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Detecting past and present intrusions through vulnerability-specific predicates
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Source ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles archive
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles table of contents
Brighton, United Kingdom
SESSION: History and context table of contents
Pages: 91 - 104  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-079-5
Also published in ...
Authors
Ashlesha Joshi  University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
Samuel T. King  University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
George W. Dunlap  University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
Peter M. Chen  University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 16,   Downloads (12 Months): 162,   Citation Count: 30
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ABSTRACT

Most systems contain software with yet-to-be-discovered security vulnerabilities. When a vulnerability is disclosed, administrators face the grim reality that they have been running software which was open to attack. Sites that value availability may be forced to continue running this vulnerable software until the accompanying patch has been tested. Our goal is to improve security by detecting intrusions that occurred before the vulnerability was disclosed and by detecting and responding to intrusions that are attempted after the vulnerability is disclosed. We detect when a vulnerability is triggered by executing vulnerability-specific predicates as the system runs or replays. This paper describes the design, implementation and evaluation of a system that supports the construction and execution of these vulnerability-specific predicates. Our system, called IntroVirt, uses virtual-machine introspection to monitor the execution of application and operating system software. IntroVirt executes predicates over past execution periods by combining virtual-machine introspection with virtual-machine replay. IntroVirt eases the construction of powerful predicates by allowing predicates to run existing target code in the context of the target system, and it uses checkpoints so that predicates can execute target code without perturbing the state of the target system. IntroVirt allows predicates to refresh themselves automatically so they work in the presence of preemptions. We show that vulnerability-specific predicates can be written easily for a wide variety of real vulnerabilities, can detect and respond to intrusions over both the past and present time intervals, and add little overhead for most vulnerabilities.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  30

Collaborative Colleagues:
Ashlesha Joshi: colleagues
Samuel T. King: colleagues
George W. Dunlap: colleagues
Peter M. Chen: colleagues