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Labels and event processes in the asbestos operating system
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Source ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles archive
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles table of contents
Brighton, United Kingdom
SESSION: Integrity and isolation table of contents
Pages: 17 - 30  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-079-5
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ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
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ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 18,   Downloads (12 Months): 129,   Citation Count: 25
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ABSTRACT

Asbestos, a new prototype operating system, provides novel labeling and isolation mechanisms that help contain the effects of exploitable software flaws. Applications can express a wide range of policies with Asbestos's kernel-enforced label mechanism, including controls on inter-process communication and system-wide information flow. A new event process abstraction provides lightweight, isolated contexts within a single process, allowing the same process to act on behalf of multiple users while preventing it from leaking any single user's data to any other user. A Web server that uses Asbestos labels to isolate user data requires about 1.5 memory pages per user, demonstrating that additional security can come at an acceptable cost.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  25

Collaborative Colleagues:
Petros Efstathopoulos: colleagues
Maxwell Krohn: colleagues
Steve VanDeBogart: colleagues
Cliff Frey: colleagues
David Ziegler: colleagues
Eddie Kohler: colleagues
David Mazières: colleagues
Frans Kaashoek: colleagues
Robert Morris: colleagues