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Micro embedded monitoring for security in application specific instruction-set processors
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Source International Conference on Compilers, Architecture and Synthesis for Embedded Systems archive
Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Compilers, architectures and synthesis for embedded systems table of contents
San Francisco, California, USA
SESSION: Threads table of contents
Pages: 304 - 314  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-149-X
Authors
Roshan G. Ragel  The University of New South Wales (UNSW) and National ICT Australia, Sydney, Australia
Sri Parameswaran  The University of New South Wales (UNSW) and National ICT Australia, Sydney, Australia
Sayed Mohammad Kia  Abbaspour University, Tehran, Iran (visiting UNSW, Sydney)
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGBED: ACM Special Interest Group on Embedded Systems
SIGMICRO: ACM Special Interest Group on Microarchitectural Research and Processing
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a methodology for monitoring security in Application Specific Instruction-set Processors (ASIPs). This is a generalized methodology for inline monitoring insecure operations in machine instructions at microinstruction level. Microinstructions are embedded into the critical machine instructions forming self checking instructions. We name this method Micro Embedded Monitoring. Since ASIPs are designed exclusively for a particular application domain, the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) of an ASIP is based on the application executed. Knowledge of the domain gives an insight into the kinds of the security threats which need to be considered. The fact that the ISA design is based on the application makes room to accommodate security monitoring support during the design phase by embedding microinstructions into the critical machine instructions. Since the microinstructions are the lowest possible software level architecture, we could expect to get better performance by implementing security detection using microinstruction routines. Four different embedded security monitoring routines are implemented for evaluation. The average performance penalty with these monitoring routines with ten different benchmarks is 1.93% while the average area and power overheads are 5.26% and 3.07% respectively.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Roshan G. Ragel: colleagues
Sri Parameswaran: colleagues
Sayed Mohammad Kia: colleagues