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Approximating state estimation in multiagent settings using particle filters
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Source International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems table of contents
The Netherlands
SESSION: Papers: learning and emergent behavior table of contents
Pages: 320 - 327  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-093-0
Authors
Prashant Doshi  University of Illinois at Chicago, IL
Piotr J. Gmytrasiewicz  University of Illinois at Chicago, IL
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

State estimation consists of updating an agent's belief given executed actions and observed evidence to date. In single agent environments, the state estimation can be formalized using the Bayes filter. Exact estimation can be performed in simple cases, but approximate techniques, like particle filtering, have been used in more realistic cases. This paper extends the particle filter to multiagent settings resulting in the interactive particle filter. The main difficulty we tackle is that to fully represent an agent's beliefs in such environments, one has to specify probability distributions over the physical state and over the beliefs of other agents. This leads to interactive hierarchical belief systems first developed in game theory. Since the update of such beliefs proceeds recursively, the interactive particle filter samples and propagates on all levels of the belief hierarchy. We present algorithms, discuss some of their properties, and illustrate the performance of our implementation using simple examples.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  7

Collaborative Colleagues:
Prashant Doshi: colleagues
Piotr J. Gmytrasiewicz: colleagues