Negotiating over small bundles of resources

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Negotiating over small bundles of resources

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International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems table of contents

The Netherlands

SESSION: Papers: negotiation and agreement I table of contents

Pages: 296 - 302

Year of Publication: 2005

ISBN:1-59593-093-0

Authors

Yann Chevaleyre	Université Paris-Daupine (France)
Ulle Endriss	Imperial College London (UK)
Jérôme Lang	Université Paul Sabatier, Toulouse (France)
Nicolas Maudet	Université Paris-Daupine (France)

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ACM New York, NY, USA

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Downloads (6 Weeks): 3, Downloads (12 Months): 19, Citation Count: 6

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ABSTRACT

When rational but myopic agents negotiate over the exchange of indivisible resources, any restriction to the negotiation protocol may prevent the system from converging to a socially optimal allocation in the general case. This paper addresses this issue by analysing how the confinement to certain classes of utility functions can enable agents to move to an optimal allocation by negotiating over small bundles of items at a time. In particular, we consider so-called k-separable domains, where the full set of resources can be divided into several preferentially independent bundles of limited cardinality.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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	3	Y. Chevaleyre, U. Endriss. and N. Maudet. On maximal classes of utility functions for efficient one-to-one negotiation. In Proc. IJCAI-2005. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 2005.
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CITED BY 7

	Antoine Nongaillard , Philippe Mathieu, A Multi-agent Resource Negotiation for Social Welfare, Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology, p.58-61, September 15-18, 2009
	Yann Chevaleyre , Ulle Endriss , Nicolas Maudet, Tractable negotiation in tree-structured domains, Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems, May 08-12, 2006, Hakodate, Japan
	Azzurra Ragone , Tommaso Noia , Eugenio Sciascio , Francesco M. Donini, Logic-based automated multi-issue bilateral negotiation in peer-to-peer e-marketplaces, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, v.16 n.3, p.249-270, June 2008
	Guoming Lai , Katia Sycara , Cuihong Li, A decentralized model for automated multi-attribute negotiations with incomplete information and general utility functions, Multiagent and Grid Systems, v.4 n.1, p.45-65, January 2008
	Azzurra Ragone , Tommaso Di Noia , Eugenio Di Sciascio , Francesco M. Donini, A logic-based framework to compute Pareto agreements in one-shot bilateral negotiation, Proceeding of the 2006 conference on ECAI 2006: 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence August 29 -- September 1, 2006, Riva del Garda, Italy, p.230-234, May 22, 2006
	Ulle Endriss , Nicolas Maudet , Fariba Sadri , Francesca Toni, Negotiating socially optimal allocations of resources, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, v.25 n.1, p.315-348, January 2006
	Yann Chevaleyre , Ulle Endriss , Nicolas Maudet, On maximal classes of utility functions for efficient one-to-one negotiation, Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence, p.941-946, July 30-August 05, 2005, Edinburgh, Scotland