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Reasoning about confidentiality at requirements engineering time
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Proceedings of the 10th European software engineering conference held jointly with 13th ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on Foundations of software engineering table of contents
Lisbon, Portugal
SESSION: Requirements table of contents
Pages: 41 - 49  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-014-0
Authors
Renaud De Landtsheer  Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium
Axel van Lamsweerde  Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium
Sponsors
SIGSOFT: ACM Special Interest Group on Software Engineering
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Growing attention is being paid to application security at requirements engineering time. Confidentiality is a particular subclass of security concerns that requires sensitive information to never be disclosed to unauthorized agents. Disclosure refers to undesired knowledge states of such agents. In previous work we have extended our requirements specification framework with epistemic constructs for capturing what agents may or may not know about the application. Roughly, an agent knows some property if the latter is found in the agent's memory.This paper makes the semantics of such constructs further precise through a formal model of how sensitive information may appear or disappear in an agent's memory. Based on this extended framework, a catalog of specification patterns is proposed to codify families of confidentiality requirements. A proof-of-concept tool is presented for early checking of requirements models against such confidentiality patterns. In case of violation, the counterexample scenarios generated by the tool show how an unauthorized agent may acquire confidential knowledge. Counter-measures should then be devised to produce further confidentiality requirements.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Renaud De Landtsheer: colleagues
Axel van Lamsweerde: colleagues