Incentives in BitTorrent induce free riding

ABSTRACT

We investigate the incentive mechanism of BitTorrent, which is a peer-to-peer file distribution system. As downloaders in BitTorrent are faced with the conflict between the eagerness to download and the unwillingness to upload, we relate this problem to the iterated prisoner's dilemma, which suggests guidelines to design a good incentive mechanism. Based on these guidelines, we propose a new, simple incentive mechanism. Our analysis and the experimental results using PlanetLab show that the original incentive mechanism of BitTorrent can induce free riding because it is not effective in rewarding and punishing downloaders properly. In contrast, a new mechanism proposed by us is shown to be more robust against free riders.

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  C. Computer Systems Organization
  C.2 COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
      C.2.4 Distributed Systems
          Subjects: Distributed applications

Additional Classification:
  J. Computer Applications
  J.4 SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
      Subjects: Economics

General Terms:
Economics, Measurement

Keywords:
BitTorrent, data dissemination, incentive mechanisms, prisoner's dilemma, strategy