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Self-recharging virtual currency
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Source Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication archive
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems table of contents
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
SESSION: Markets table of contents
Pages: 93 - 98  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-026-4
Authors
David Irwin  Duke University
Jeff Chase  Duke University
Laura Grit  Duke University
Aydan Yumerefendi  Duke University
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Market-based control is attractive for networked computing utilities in which consumers compete for shared resources (computers, storage, network bandwidth). This paper proposes a new self-recharging virtual currency model as a common medium of exchange in a computational market. The key idea is to recycle currency through the economy automatically while bounding the rate of spending by consumers. Currency budgets may be distributed among consumers according to any global policy; consumers spend their budgets to schedule their resource usage through time, but cannot hoard their currency or starve.We outline the design and rationale for self-recharging currency in Cereus, a system for market-based community resource sharing, in which participants are authenticated and sanctions are sufficient to discourage fraudulent behavior. Currency transactions in Cereus are accountable: offline third-party audits can detect and prove cheating, so participants may transfer and recharge currency autonomously without involvement of the trusted banking service.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
David Irwin: colleagues
Jeff Chase: colleagues
Laura Grit: colleagues
Aydan Yumerefendi: colleagues