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Shake them up!: a movement-based pairing protocol for CPU-constrained devices
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Source International Conference On Mobile Systems, Applications And Services archive
Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services table of contents
Seattle, Washington
SESSION: Shake 'em, but don't crack 'em table of contents
Pages: 51 - 64  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-931971-31-5
Authors
Claude Castelluccia  INRIA and University of California, Irvine
Pars Mutaf  INRIA
Sponsors
SIGMOBILE: ACM Special Interest Group on Mobility of Systems, Users, Data and Computing
USENIX: USENIX Association
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a new pairing protocol that allows two CPU-constrained wireless devices Alice and Bob to establish a shared secret at a very low cost. To our knowledge, this is the first software pairing scheme that does not rely on expensive public-key cryptography, out-of-band channels (such as a keyboard or a display) or specific hardware, making it inexpensive and suitable for CPU-constrained devices such as sensors.

In the described protocol, Alice can send the secret bit 1 to Bob by broadcasting an (empty) packet with the source field set to Alice. Similarly, Alice can send the secret bit 0 to Bob by broadcasting an (empty) packet with the source field set to Bob. Only Bob can identify the real source of the packet (since it did not send it, the source is Alice), and can recover the secret bit (1 if the source is set to Alice or 0 otherwise). An eavesdropper cannot retrieve the secret bit since it cannot figure out whether the packet was actually sent by Alice or Bob. By randomly generating n such packets Alice and Bob can agree on an n-bit secret key.

Our scheme requires that the devices being paired, Alice and Bob, are shaken during the key exchange protocol. This is to guarantee that an eavesdropper cannot identify the packets sent by Alice from those sent by Bob using data from the RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator) registers available in commercial wireless cards. The proposed protocol works with off-the-shelf 802.11 wireless cards and is secure against eavesdropping attacks that use power analysis. It requires, however, some firmware changes to protect against attacks that attempt to identify the source of packets from their transmission frequency.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  10

Collaborative Colleagues:
Claude Castelluccia: colleagues
Pars Mutaf: colleagues