Cracking the Bluetooth PIN

ABSTRACT

This paper describes the implementation of an attack on the Bluetooth security mechanism. Specifically, we describe a passive attack, in which an attacker can find the PIN used during the pairing process. We then describe the cracking speed we can achieve through three optimizations methods. Our fastest optimization employs an algebraic representation of a central cryptographic primitive (SAFER+) used in Bluetooth. Our results show that a 4-digit PIN can be cracked in less than 0.3 sec on an old Pentium III 450MHz computer, and in 0.06 sec on a Pentium IV 3Ghz HT computer.

REFERENCES

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  C. Computer Systems Organization
  C.2 COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
      C.2.0 General
          Subjects: Security and protection (e.g., firewalls)

Additional Classification:
  C. Computer Systems Organization
  C.2 COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
      C.2.1 Network Architecture and Design
          Subjects: Wireless communication

  E. Data
  E.3 DATA ENCRYPTION

General Terms:
Algorithms, Design, Security