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Simulatable auditing
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Proceedings of the twenty-fourth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems table of contents
Baltimore, Maryland
SESSION: Research session 3: security and privacy table of contents
Pages: 118 - 127  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-062-0
Authors
Krishnaram Kenthapadi  Stanford University, Stanford, CA
Nina Mishra  Stanford University, Stanford, CA
Kobbi Nissim  Ben-Gurion University, Israel
Sponsors
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
SIGMOD: ACM Special Interest Group on Management of Data
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 4,   Downloads (12 Months): 75,   Citation Count: 18
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ABSTRACT

Given a data set consisting of private information about individuals, we consider the online query auditing problem: given a sequence of queries that have already been posed about the data, their corresponding answers -- where each answer is either the true answer or "denied" (in the event that revealing the answer compromises privacy) -- and given a new query, deny the answer if privacy may be breached or give the true answer otherwise. A related problem is the offline auditing problem where one is given a sequence of queries and all of their true answers and the goal is to determine if a privacy breach has already occurred.We uncover the fundamental issue that solutions to the offline auditing problem cannot be directly used to solve the online auditing problem since query denials may leak information. Consequently, we introduce a new model called simulatable auditing where query denials provably do not leak information. We demonstrate that max queries may be audited in this simulatable paradigm under the classical definition of privacy where a breach occurs if a sensitive value is fully compromised. We also introduce a probabilistic notion of (partial) compromise. Our privacy definition requires that the a-priori probability that a sensitive value lies within some small interval is not that different from the posterior probability (given the query answers). We demonstrate that sum queries can be audited in a simulatable fashion under this privacy definition.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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C. Dwork and K. Nissim. Privacy-preserving datamining on vertically partitioned databases. In CRYPTO, 2004.
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L. Lovasz and M. Simonovits. Random walks in a convex body and an improved volume algorithm. Random Structures and Algorithms, 4:359--412, 1993.
 
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CITED BY  18
Collaborative Colleagues:
Krishnaram Kenthapadi: colleagues
Nina Mishra: colleagues
Kobbi Nissim: colleagues