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The feasibility of launching and detecting jamming attacks in wireless networks
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Source International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking & Computing archive
Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing table of contents
Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA
SESSION: Security table of contents
Pages: 46 - 57  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-004-3
Authors
Wenyuan Xu  Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Wade Trappe  Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Yanyong Zhang  Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Timothy Wood  Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Sponsors
SIGMOBILE: ACM Special Interest Group on Mobility of Systems, Users, Data and Computing
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 30,   Downloads (12 Months): 197,   Citation Count: 36
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ABSTRACT

Wireless networks are built upon a shared medium that makes it easy for adversaries to launch jamming-style attacks. These attacks can be easily accomplished by an adversary emitting radio frequency signals that do not follow an underlying MAC protocol. Jamming attacks can severely interfere with the normal operation of wireless networks and, consequently, mechanisms are needed that can cope with jamming attacks. In this paper, we examine radio interference attacks from both sides of the issue: first, we study the problem of conducting radio interference attacks on wireless networks, and second we examine the critical issue of diagnosing the presence of jamming attacks. Specifically, we propose four different jamming attack models that can be used by an adversary to disable the operation of a wireless network, and evaluate their effectiveness in terms of how each method affects the ability of a wireless node to send and receive packets. We then discuss different measurements that serve as the basis for detecting a jamming attack, and explore scenarios where each measurement by itself is not enough to reliably classify the presence of a jamming attack. In particular, we observe that signal strength and carrier sensing time are unable to conclusively detect the presence of a jammer. Further, we observe that although by using packet delivery ratio we may differentiate between congested and jammed scenarios, we are nonetheless unable to conclude whether poor link utility is due to jamming or the mobility of nodes. The fact that no single measurement is sufficient for reliably classifying the presence of a jammer is an important observation, and necessitates the development of enhanced detection schemes that can remove ambiguity when detecting a jammer. To address this need, we propose two enhanced detection protocols that employ consistency checking. The first scheme employs signal strength measurements as a reactive consistency check for poor packet delivery ratios, while the second scheme employs location information to serve as the consistency check. Throughout our discussions, we examine the feasibility and effectiveness of jamming attacks and detection schemes using the MICA2 Mote platform.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  36

Collaborative Colleagues:
Wenyuan Xu: colleagues
Wade Trappe: colleagues
Yanyong Zhang: colleagues
Timothy Wood: colleagues