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Toward resilient security in wireless sensor networks
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Source International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking & Computing archive
Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing table of contents
Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA
SESSION: Security table of contents
Pages: 34 - 45  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-004-3
Authors
Hao Yang  UCLA, Los Angeles, CA
Fan Ye  IBM T.J. Watson, Hawthorne, NY
Yuan Yuan  University of Maryland, MD
Songwu Lu  UCLA, Los Angeles, CA
William Arbaugh  University of Maryland, MD
Sponsors
SIGMOBILE: ACM Special Interest Group on Mobility of Systems, Users, Data and Computing
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Node compromise poses severe security threats in wireless sensor networks. Unfortunately, existing security designs can address only a small, fixed threshold number of compromised nodes; the security protection completely breaks down when the threshold is exceeded. In this paper, we seek to overcome the threshold limitation and achieve resiliency against an increasing number of compromised nodes. To this end, we propose a novel location-based approach in which the secret keys are bound to geographic locations, and each node stores a few keys based on its own location. The location-binding property constrains the scope for which individual keys can be (mis)used, thus limiting the damages caused by a collection of compromised nodes. We illustrate this approach through the problem of report fabrication attacks, in which the compromised nodes forge non-existent events. We evaluate our design through extensive analysis, implementation and simulations, and demonstrate its graceful performance degradation in the presence of an increasing number of compromised nodes.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  11

Collaborative Colleagues:
Hao Yang: colleagues
Fan Ye: colleagues
Yuan Yuan: colleagues
Songwu Lu: colleagues
William Arbaugh: colleagues