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Verification and change-impact analysis of access-control policies
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Source International Conference on Software Engineering archive
Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Software engineering table of contents
St. Louis, MO, USA
SESSION: Change management table of contents
Pages: 196 - 205  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-963-2
Authors
Kathi Fisler  WPI
Shriram Krishnamurthi  Brown University
Leo A. Meyerovich  Brown University
Michael Carl Tschantz  Brown University
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSOFT: ACM Special Interest Group on Software Engineering
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 16,   Downloads (12 Months): 112,   Citation Count: 25
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ABSTRACT

Sensitive data are increasingly available on-line through the Web and other distributed protocols. This heightens the need to carefully control access to data. Control means not only preventing the leakage of data but also permitting access to necessary information. Indeed, the same datum is often treated differently depending on context.System designers create policies to express conditions on the access to data. To reduce source clutter and improve maintenance, developers increasingly use domain-specific, declarative languages to express these policies. In turn, administrators need to analyze policies relative to properties, and to understand the effect of policy changes even in the absence of properties.This paper presents Margrave, a software suite for analyzing role-based access-control policies. Margrave includes a verifier that analyzes policies written in the XACML language, translating them into a form of decision-diagram to answer queries. It also provides semantic differencing information between versions of policies. We have implemented these techniques and applied them to policies from a working software application.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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CITED BY  25

Collaborative Colleagues:
Kathi Fisler: colleagues
Shriram Krishnamurthi: colleagues
Leo A. Meyerovich: colleagues
Michael Carl Tschantz: colleagues