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A convenient method for securely managing passwords
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Source International World Wide Web Conference archive
Proceedings of the 14th international conference on World Wide Web table of contents
Chiba, Japan
SESSION: Security through the eyes of users table of contents
Pages: 471 - 479  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-046-9
Authors
J. Alex Halderman  Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Brent Waters  Stanford University
Edward W. Felten  Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Sponsor
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 27,   Downloads (12 Months): 255,   Citation Count: 13
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ABSTRACT

Computer users are asked to generate, keep secret, and recall an increasing number of passwords for uses including host accounts, email servers, e-commerce sites, and online financial services. Unfortunately, the password entropy that users can comfortably memorize seems insufficient to store unique, secure passwords for all these accounts, and it is likely to remain constant as the number of passwords (and the adversary's computational power) increases into the future. In this paper, we propose a technique that uses a strengthened cryptographic hash function to compute secure passwords for arbitrarily many accounts while requiring the user to memorize only a single short password. This mechanism functions entirely on the client; no server-side changes are needed. Unlike previous approaches, our design is both highly resistant to brute force attacks and nearly stateless, allowing users to retrieve their passwords from any location so long as they can execute our program and remember a short secret. This combination of security and convenience will, we believe, entice users to adopt our scheme. We discuss the construction of our algorithm in detail, compare its strengths and weaknesses to those of related approaches, and present Password Multiplier, an implementation in the form of an extension to the Mozilla Firefox web browser.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
Microsoft Passport service. http://www.passport.net.
 
2
OpenSSL: The open source toolkit for SSL/TLS. http://www.openssl.org.
 
3
Martín Abadi, T. Mark A. Lomas, and Roger Needham. Strengthening passwords. Technical Report 1997 - 033, 1997.
 
4
Mihir Bellare, David Pointcheval, and Phillip Rogaway. Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks. In EUROCRYPT, pages 139--155, 2000.
 
5
E. Felten, D. Balfanz, D. Dean, and D. Wallach. Web spoofing: An Internet con game. Proc. 20th National Information Systems Security Conference, 1997.
 
6
 
7
Rosario Gennaro and Yehuda Lindell. A framework for password-based authenticated key exchange. In EUROCRYPT, pages 524--543, 2003.
 
8
J. Jeff, Y. Alan, B. Ross, and A. Alasdair. The memorability and security of passwords -- some empirical results, 2000.
 
9
Ian Jermyn, Alain Mayer, Fabian Monrose, Michael K. Reiter, and Aviel D. Rubin. The design and analysis of graphical passwords. 1999.
 
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13
U. Manber. A simple scheme to make passwords based on one-way functions much harder to crack, 1996.
14
 
15
Blake Ross, Collin Jackson, Nicholas Miyake, Dan Boneh, and John C. Mitchell. A browser plug-in solution to the unique password problem, 2005. Technical report, Stanford-SecLab-TR-2005-1.
 
16
Bruce Schneier et al. Password Safe application. http://www.schneier.com/passsafe.html.
 
17
Joe Smith. Password Safe cracker utility. http://members.aol.com/jpeschel3/recovery.htm.

CITED BY  13

Collaborative Colleagues:
J. Alex Halderman: colleagues
Brent Waters: colleagues
Edward W. Felten: colleagues