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New and improved constructions of non-malleable cryptographic protocols
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Source Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Baltimore, MD, USA
SESSION: Session 11A table of contents
Pages: 533 - 542  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-58113-960-8
Authors
Rafael Pass  CSAIL, MIT, Cambridge, MA
Alon Rosen  CSAIL, MIT, Cambridge, MA
Sponsors
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We present a new constant round protocol for non-malleable zero-knowledge. Using this protocol as a subroutine, we obtain a new constant-round protocol for non-malleable commitments. Our constructions rely on the existence of (standard) collision resistant hash functions. Previous constructions either relied on the existence of trapdoor permutations and hash functions that are collision resistant against sub-exponential sized circuits, or required a super-constant number of rounds.Additional results are the first construction of a non-malleable commitment scheme that is statistically hiding (with respect to opening), and the first non-malleable protocols that satisfy a strict polynomial-time simulation requirement. The latter are constructed by additionally assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations.Our approach differs from the approaches taken in previous works in that we view non-malleable zero-knowledge as a building-block rather than an end goal. This gives rise to a modular construction of non-malleable commitments and results in a somewhat simpler analysis.The techniques that we use to construct our zero-knowl-edge protocol are non black-box, but are different than the non black-box techniques previously used in the context of non-malleable coin-tossing.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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