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On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography
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Source Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Baltimore, MD, USA
SESSION: Session 2A table of contents
Pages: 84 - 93  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-58113-960-8
Author
Oded Regev  Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel
Sponsors
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 17,   Downloads (12 Months): 134,   Citation Count: 12
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ABSTRACT

Our main result is a reduction from worst-case lattice problems such as SVP and SIVP to a certain learning problem. This learning problem is a natural extension of the 'learning from parity with error' problem to higher moduli. It can also be viewed as the problem of decoding from a random linear code. This, we believe, gives a strong indication that these problems are hard. Our reduction, however, is quantum. Hence, an efficient solution to the learning problem implies a quantum algorithm for SVP and SIVP. A main open question is whether this reduction can be made classical.Using the main result, we obtain a public-key cryptosystem whose hardness is based on the worst-case quantum hardness of SVP and SIVP. Previous lattice-based public-key cryptosystems such as the one by Ajtai and Dwork were only based on unique-SVP, a special case of SVP. The new cryptosystem is much more efficient than previous cryptosystems: the public key is of size Õ(n2) and encrypting a message increases its size by Õ(n)(in previous cryptosystems these values are Õ(n4) and Õ(n2), respectively). In fact, under the assumption that all parties share a random bit string of length Õ(n2), the size of the public key can be reduced to Õ(n).


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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M. Ajtai. Generating hard instances of lattice problems. In ECCCTR: Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity, technical reports, 1996.
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