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ABSTRACT
Stack-smashing by buffer overflow is a common tactic used by viruses and worms to crash or hijack systems. Exploiting a bounds-unchecked copy into a stack buffer, an attacker can---by supplying a specially-crafted and unexpectedly long input---overwrite a stored return address and trigger the execution of code of her choosing. In this paper, we propose to protect code from this common form of attack using dynamic instruction stream editing (DISE), a previously proposed hardware mechanism that implements binary rewriting in a transparent, efficient, and convenient way by rewriting the dynamic instruction stream rather than the static executable. Simply, we define productions (rewriting rules) that instrument program calls and returns to maintain and verify a "shadow" stack of return addresses in a protected region of memory. When invalid return addresses are detected, the application is terminated.The DISE implementation resembles previous software schemes like StackGuard and the Return Address Defender (RAD), but it can operate without source code and in dynamically-linked libraries and dynamically-generated code. It also has natural facilities for protecting the shadow stack, which provides little security if it itself is vulnerable. Finally, unlike software instrumentation, DISE checks---which are inserted by the processor at runtime---cannot be bypassed or subverted.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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