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An architecture a day keeps the hacker away
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Volume 33 ,  Issue 1  (March 2005) table of contents
Special issue: Workshop on architectural support for security and anti-virus (WASSA)
SPECIAL ISSUE: Workshop on architectural support for security and anti-virus (WASSA) table of contents
Pages: 34 - 41  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISSN:0163-5964
Authors
David A. Holland  Harvard University
Ada T. Lim  Harvard University
Margo I. Seltzer  Harvard University
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

System security as it is practiced today is a losing battle. In this paper, we outline a possible comprehensive solution for binary-based attacks, using virtual machines, machine descriptions, and randomization to achieve broad heterogeneity at the machine level. This heterogeneity increases the "cost" of broad-based binary attacks to a sufficiently high level that they cease to become feasible. The convergence of several recent technologies appears to make our approach achievable at a reasonable cost, with only moderate run-time overhead.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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C. Cowan, S. Beattie, J. Johansen, and P. Wagle. Pointguard#8482;: Protecting pointers from buffer overflow vulnerabilities. In Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 91--104, Washington, DC, August 2003.
 
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D. Geer, R. Bace, P. Gutmann, P. Metzger, C. Pfleeger, J. Quarterman, and B. Schneier. Cyber insecurity: The cost of monopoly. Technical report, Computer & Communications Industry Association, 2003.
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D. Seeley. A tour of the worm. In Proceedings of the 1989 Winter USENIX Conference, January 1989.
 
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K. Seifried. Honeypotting with vmware - basics, 2002. Online. Internet. March 9, 2004. Available WWW: http://www.seifried.org/security/ids/20020107-honeypot-vmware-basics.html.
 
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J. Xu, Z. Kalbarczyk, and R. K. Iyer. Transparent runtime randomization for security. In Proceedings of the 22nd Symposium on Reliable and Distributed Systems, Florence, Italy, October 2003.


Collaborative Colleagues:
David A. Holland: colleagues
Ada T. Lim: colleagues
Margo I. Seltzer: colleagues