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Statically checking confidentiality via dynamic labels
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Source Annual Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages archive
Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security table of contents
Long Beach, California
Pages: 50 - 56  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-58113-980-2
Authors
Bart Jacobs  Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Wolter Pieters  Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Martijn Warnier  Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Sponsor
SIGPLAN: ACM Special Interest Group on Programming Languages
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 9,   Downloads (12 Months): 22,   Citation Count: 3
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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a new approach for verifying confidentiality for programs, based on abstract interpretation. The framework is formally developed and proved correct in the theorem prover PVS. We use dynamic labeling functions to abstractly interpret a simple programming language via modification of security levels of variables. Our approach is sound and compositional and results in an algorithm for statically checking confidentiality.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
Ádám Darvas, Reiner Hähnle, and Dave Sands. A theorem proving approach to analysis of secure information flow. In Roberto Gorrieri, editor, Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security, WITS. IFIP WG 1.7, ACM SIGPLAN and GI FoMSESS, 2003.
 
2
Wolfgang Ahrendt, Thomas Baar, Bernhard Beckert, Richard Bubel, Martin Giese, Reiner Hähnle, Wolfram Menzel, Wojciech Mostowski, Andreas Roth, Steffen Schlager, and Peter H. Schmitt. The KeY tool. Software and System Modeling, 2003. To appear.
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Giles Barthe, Amitabh Basu, and Tamara Rezk. Security Types Preserving Compilation. In VMCAI'04 Proceedings, LNCS. Springer, Berlin, 2004.
 
6
K. J. Biba. Integrity considerations for secure computer systems. Technical Report MTR-3153, MITRE Corp., 1977.
 
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David R. Cok and Joseph R. Kiniry. ESC/Java2: Uniting ESC/Java and JML. Technical Report NIII-R0413, Nijmegen Institute for Computer and Information Sciences, 2004. available at http://www.cs.ru.nl/research/reports/info/NIII-R0413.html.
 
9
David R. Cok and Joseph R. Kiniry. ESC/Java2: Uniting ESC/Java and JML. In Proceedings of CASSIS: Construction and Analysis of Safe, Secure and Interoperable Smart devices, LNCS. Springer-Verlag, to appear. See the associated technical rapport {8}.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Bart Jacobs: colleagues
Wolter Pieters: colleagues
Martijn Warnier: colleagues