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Weaknesses of Yoon-Ryu-Yoo's hash-based password authentication scheme
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Source ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review archive
Volume 39 ,  Issue 1  (January 2005) table of contents
Pages: 85 - 89  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISSN:0163-5980
Authors
Wei-Chi Ku  Fu Jen Catholic University, Hsinchuang, Taipei County, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Min-Hung Chiang  Fu Jen Catholic University, Hsinchuang, Taipei County, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Shen-Tien Chang  Fu Jen Catholic University, Hsinchuang, Taipei County, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In 2000, Peyravian and Zunic proposed an efficient hash-based password authentication scheme that can be easily implemented. Later, Lee, Li, and Hwang demonstrated that Peyravian-Zunic's scheme is vulnerable to an off-line guessing attack, and then proposed an improved version. However, Ku, Chen, and Lee pointed out that their scheme can not resist an off-line guessing attack, a denial-of-service attack, and a stolen-verifier attack. Recently, Yoon, Ryu, and Yoo proposed an improved scheme of Lee-Li-Hwang's scheme. Unfortunately, we find that Yoon-Ryu-Yoo's scheme is still vulnerable to an off-line guessing attack and a stolen-verifier attack. Furthermore, their scheme can not achieve backward secrecy. Herein, we first briefly review Yoon-Ryu-Yoo's scheme and then describe its weaknesses.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
C. M. Chen and W. C. Ku, "Stolen-verifier attack on two new strong-password authentication protocols," IEICE Transactions on Communications, vol. E58-B, no. 11, pp. 2519--2521, Nov. 2002.
 
2
J. J. Hwang and T. C. Yeh, "Improvement on Peyravian-Zunic's password authentication schemes," IEICE Transactions on Communications, vol. E85-B, no. 4, pp. 823--825, April 2002.
 
3
W. C. Ku, C. M. Chen, and H. L. Lee, "Cryptanalysis of a variant of Peyravian-Zunic's password authentication scheme," IEICE Transactions on Communications, vol. E86-B, no. 5, pp. 1682--1684, May 2003.
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C. L. Lin, H. M. Sun, and T. Hwang, "Attacks and solutions on strong-password authentication," IEICE Transactions on Communications, vol. E84-B, no. 9, pp. 2622--2627, Sept. 2001.
 
7
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure hash standard," FIPS Publication 180-1, April 1995.
 
8
M. Peyravian and N. Zunic, "Methods for protecting password transmission," Computers & Security, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 466--469, July 2000.
 
9
R. Rivest, "The MD5 message-digest algorithm," RFC 1321, April 1992.
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Wei-Chi Ku: colleagues
Min-Hung Chiang: colleagues
Shen-Tien Chang: colleagues