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TRIAD: a framework for survivability architecting
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Survivable and self-regenerative systems: in association with 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security table of contents
Fairfax, VA
Pages: 105 - 109  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-784-2
Authors
Andrew P. Moore  Camegie Mellon University
Robert J. Ellison  Camegie Mellon University
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

High confidence in a system's survivability requires an accurate understanding of the system's threat environment and the impact of that environment on system operations. This paper describes a framework for intrusion-aware design called trustworthy refinement through intrusion-aware design (TRIAD). The spiral structure of TRIAD iterates through three sectors of activity for developing the architectural strategy, for instantiating the architecture using technical components, and for analyzing the impact of the threat environment on system operations. TRIAD helps developers of complex, internetworked information systems to formulate, implement, and maintain a coherent, justifiable, and affordable survivability strategy that addresses mission-compromising threats for their organization. TRIAD facilitates planning for the inevitable change to the threat and operational environment and helps trace the effect of change back to the survivability requirements and architecture.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Bachmann, F.; Bass, L.; & Klein, M. Deriving Architectural Tactics: A Step Toward Methodical Architectural Design (CMU/SEI-03-TR-004). Software Engineering Institute, 2003. <http://www.sei.cmu.edu/publications/documents>
 
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Ellison R. & Moore, A. Trustworthy Refinement through Intrusion-aware Design (TRIAD) (CMU/SEI-03-TR-002), Software Engineering Institute, 2003. <http://www.sei.cmu.edu/publications/documents>
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Andrew P. Moore: colleagues
Robert J. Ellison: colleagues