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A holistic approach to service survivability
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Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Survivable and self-regenerative systems: in association with 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security table of contents
Fairfax, VA
Pages: 11 - 22  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-784-2
Authors
Angelos D. Keromytis  Columbia University
Janak Parekh  Columbia University
Philip N. Gross  Columbia University
Gail Kaiser  Columbia University
Vishal Misra  Columbia University
Jason Nieh  Columbia University
Dan Rubenstein  Columbia University
Sal Stolfo  Columbia University
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We present SABER (Survivability Architecture: Block, Evade, React), a proposed survivability architecture that blocks, evades and reacts to a variety of attacks by using several security and survivability mechanisms in an automated and coordinated fashion. Contrary to the ad hoc manner in which contemporary survivable systems are built-using isolated, independent security mechanisms such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and software sandboxes-SABER integrates several different technologies in an attempt to provide a unified framework for responding to the wide range of attacks malicious insiders and outsiders can launch.

This coordinated multi-layer approach will be capable of defending against attacks targeted at various levels of the network stack, such as congestion-based DoS attacks, software-based DoS or code-injection attacks, and others. Our fundamental insight is that while multiple lines of defense are useful, most conventional, uncoordinated approaches fail to exploit the full range of available responses to incidents. By coordinating the response, the ability to survive successful security breaches increases substantially.

We discuss the key components of SABER, how they will be integrated together, and how we can leverage on the promising results of the individual components to improve survivability in a variety of coordinated attack scenarios. SABER is currently in the prototyping stages, with several interesting open research topics.


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Collaborative Colleagues:
Angelos D. Keromytis: colleagues
Janak Parekh: colleagues
Philip N. Gross: colleagues
Gail Kaiser: colleagues
Vishal Misra: colleagues
Jason Nieh: colleagues
Dan Rubenstein: colleagues
Sal Stolfo: colleagues