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TinySec: a link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks
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Source Conference On Embedded Networked Sensor Systems archive
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems table of contents
Baltimore, MD, USA
SESSION: Services table of contents
Pages: 162 - 175  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-879-2
Authors
Chris Karlof  University of California at Berkeley
Naveen Sastry  University of California at Berkeley
David Wagner  University of California at Berkeley
Sponsors
SIGARCH: ACM Special Interest Group on Computer Architecture
SIGBED: ACM Special Interest Group on Embedded Systems
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGMOBILE: ACM Special Interest Group on Mobility of Systems, Users, Data and Computing
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
SIGMETRICS: ACM Special Interest Group on Measurement and Evaluation
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We introduce TinySec, the first fully-implemented link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks. In our design, we leverage recent lessons learned from design vulnerabilities in security protocols for other wireless networks such as 802.11b and GSM. Conventional security protocols tend to be conservative in their security guarantees, typically adding 16--32 bytes of overhead. With small memories, weak processors, limited energy, and 30 byte packets, sensor networks cannot afford this luxury. TinySec addresses these extreme resource constraints with careful design; we explore the tradeoffs among different cryptographic primitives and use the inherent sensor network limitations to our advantage when choosing parameters to find a sweet spot for security, packet overhead, and resource requirements. TinySec is portable to a variety of hardware and radio platforms. Our experimental results on a 36 node distributed sensor network application clearly demonstrate that software based link layer protocols are feasible and efficient, adding less than 10% energy, latency, and bandwidth overhead.


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CITED BY  93

Collaborative Colleagues:
Chris Karlof: colleagues
Naveen Sastry: colleagues
David Wagner: colleagues