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The dual receiver cryptosystem and its applications
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Washington DC, USA
SESSION: Cryptographic tools table of contents
Pages: 330 - 343  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-961-6
Authors
Theodore Diament  Columbia University
Homin K. Lee  Columbia University
Angelos D. Keromytis  Columbia University
Moti Yung  Columbia University
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We put forth the notion of a dual receiver cryptosystem and implement it based on bilinear pairings over certain elliptic curve groups. The cryptosystem is simple and efficient yet powerful, as it solves two problems of practical importance whose solutions have proven to be elusive before:(1) A provably secure "combined" public-key cryptosystem (with a single secret key per user in space-limited environment) where the key is used for both decryption and signing and where encryption can be escrowed and recovered, while the signature capability never leaves its owner. This is an open problem proposed by the work of Haber and Pinkas. (2) A puzzle is a method for rate-limiting remote users by forcing them to solve a computational task (the puzzle). Puzzles have been based on cryptographic challenges in the past, but the successful design of embedding a useful cryptographic task inside a puzzle, originally posed by Dwork and Naor, remained an open problem till today. We model and present "useful security puzzles" applicable in two scenarios: a secure fileserver, and an online transaction server (such as a webserver).


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Theodore Diament: colleagues
Homin K. Lee: colleagues
Angelos D. Keromytis: colleagues
Moti Yung: colleagues