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Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols
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Source Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks table of contents
Washington DC, USA
SESSION: Secure routing in ad hoc networks table of contents
Pages: 94 - 105  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-972-1
Authors
Levente Buttyán  Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary
István Vajda  Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 8,   Downloads (12 Months): 90,   Citation Count: 10
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ABSTRACT

We propose a formal framework for the security analysis of on-demand source routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks. Our approach is based on the well-known simulation paradigm that has been proposed to prove the security of cryptographic protocols. Our main contribution is the application of the simulation-based approach in the context of ad hoc routing. This involves a precise definition of a real-world model, which describes the real operation of the protocol, and an ideal-world model, which captures what the protocol wants to achieve in terms of security. Both models take into account the peculiarities of wireless communications and ad hoc routing. Then, we give a formal definition of routing security in terms of indistinguishability of the two models from the point of view of honest parties. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by analyzing two "secure" ad hoc routing protocols, SRP and Ariadne. This analysis leads to the discovery of as yet unknown attacks against both protocols. Finally, we propose a new ad hoc routing protocol and prove it to be secure in our model.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  10

Collaborative Colleagues:
Levente Buttyán: colleagues
István Vajda: colleagues